Papers deposited at this website (PDF or ePrint) and at working paper archives (denoted as WP) are downloadable freely without the need for an account. Journal links to papers could be behind a paywall unless otherwise noted, in which case the final draft version is also provided with a downloadable link next to the journal link.
Browse by Topics
- Economic Design for Kidney Exchange
- Economic Design for Liver Exchange
- Axiomatic Resource Allocation
- Balanced Exchange in Matching Markets
- Pandemic Resource Allocation via Reserves
- Constitutional Design
- Economic Design for Adoption of Children
- Contest Design, Penalty Shootouts
- Failures in Labor Markets
- Other
- Surveys
Kidney Exchange
“Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators, and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Bumin Yenmez) Management Science, forthcoming
[ Open Access ]
[ Latest Draft: May 2023:arXiv ] [ video present.: short ]
- Refereed proceeding publication of its extended abstract:
EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2021) 785-786.
[Proceeding] - Explanation of this paper’s policy impact and resources regarding software implementation resources we developed are available at www.covid19reservesystem.org.
- Related: My other policy-oriented working papers and published papers on pandemic resource allocation can be reached at www.covid19reservesystem.org/research.
- Initial Draft: “Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing”
[ April 2020:WP | NBER ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- EQUITY
- HEALTH
- AXIOMATICS
“The First 4-Way Liver Paired Exchange from an Interdisciplinary Collaboration between Healthcare Professionals and Design Economists,” (with Sezai Yilmaz, Tayfun Sönmez, Volkan Ince, Sami Akbulut, Burak Isik, Sukru Emre) American Journal of Transplantation, forthcoming.
[ Journal ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- LIVER EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
“Weighted Lottery to Equitably Allocate Scarce Supply of COVID-19 Monoclonal Antibody,” (with Erin K. McCreary, Utibe R. Essien, Chung-Chou H. Chang, Rachel A. Butler, Parag Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, Ashley Steiner, Maddie Chrisman, Derek C. Angus, Douglas B. White) JAMA Health Forum, (2023) 4(9):e232774.
[ Journal ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- EQUITY
- lottery implementation
“Reserve System Design for Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources in a Pandemic: Some Perspectives from the Field” (with Parag A. Pathak, Govind Persad, and Tayfun Sönmez) Oxford Review of Economic Policy, (Winter 2022) 38(4): 924–940
[ Journal | WP ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- EQUITY
- PERSPECTIVES
“Neutral Allocation of Discrete Resources with Outside Options” (with Marek Pycia) Review of Economic Design, special issue in honor of Semih Koray, (December 2022) 26(4): 581–604
[ Open Access ]
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION
- AXIOMATICS
- MECHANISM DESIGN
“A Multi-center Weighted Lottery to Equitably Allocate Scarce Covid-19 Therapeutics” (with Douglas B. White, Erin K. McCreary, Chung-Chou H. Chang, Mark Schmidhofer, Ryan Bariola, Naudia N. Jonaissant, Govind Persad, Robert D. Truog, Parag Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez) American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine, (2022) 206(4): 503-506
[ Journal ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- EQUITY
- lottery implementation
“Designing Practical and Fair Sequential Team Contests: The Case of Penalty Shootouts” (with Nejat Anbarci and Ching-Jen Sun) Games and Economic Behavior, (November 2021) 130: 25-43
[ Journal | WP ] [ Older Draft (Feb. 2018): WP ]
- DYNAMIC CONTESTS DESIGN
- FAIRNESS
- AXIOMATICS
- unintended consequences
“A Novel Approach to Equitable Distribution of Scarce Therapeutics: Institutional Experience Implementing a Reserve System for Allocation of Covid-19 Monoclonal Antibodies” (with Emily Rubin, Scott L. Dryden-Peterson, Sarah P. Hammond, Parag A. Pathak, and Tayfun Sönmez) CHEST, (December 2021) 160(6): 2324-2331
[ Journal | ePrint ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- EQUITY
- MARKET DESIGN
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- PERSPECTIVES
Extended Abstract for “Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences” (with Xiang Han, Onur Kesten) EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2021) 585-586.
[ Proceeding]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- HEALTH
- pricing rules
“Categorized Priority Systems: A New Tool for Fairly Allocating Scarce Medical Resources in the Face of Profound Social Inequities,” (with Tayfun Sönmez, Parag A. Pathak, Govind Persad, Robert D. Truog, and Douglas White) CHEST, (March 2021) 159(3): 1294-1299
[ Journal | ePrint ]
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- EQUITY
“Incentivized Kidney Exchange,” (with Tayfun Sönmez and M. Bumin Yenmez) American Economic Review, (July 2020) 110(7): 2198-2224
[ ePrint & Online App. & Data Set ] [ Slides ]
[ First draft (Jan. 2015) (with Tayfun Sönmez): WP ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- LARGE MARKETS
- DYNAMIC MATCHING
- gains on the extensive margin
“Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange,” (with Haluk Ergin and Tayfun Sönmez) Econometrica, (May 2020) 88(3): 965–1005
[ ePrint & Online App. ] [ Slides ]
[ Older draft including two-size mechanism: WP ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- LIVER EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- gains on the extensive margin
“Two-Sided Matching via Balanced Exchange,” (with Umut Dur) Journal of Political Economy, (June 2019) 127(3): 1156-1177
[ ePrint & Online App. | WP ] [ Slides ]
- TWO-SIDED MATCHING
- PROPERTY RIGHTS
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- AXIOMATICS
- market failure
“How (Not) to Integrate Blood Subtyping Technology to Kidney Exchange,” (with Tayfun Sönmez and Özgür Yilmaz) Journal of Economic Theory, (July 2018) 176: 193-231
[ Journal | WP ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- unintended consequences
“Dual-Donor Organ Exchange,” (with Haluk Ergin and Tayfun Sönmez) Econometrica, (September 2017) 85(5): 1645-1671
[ ePrint & Online Appendix & Simulation Files ] [ Slides ]
[ Older draft (Nov. 2015) “Lung Exchange”: PDF | Presentation ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- LUNG EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
“Incentive Compatible Allocation and Exchange of Discrete Resources,” (with Marek Pycia) Theoretical Economics, (January 2017) 12(1): 287–329
[ Open Access ]
[ Older drafts (May 2015): WP | (Feb. 2014): WP | (Nov. 2011): PDF ]
- Related: “Trading Cycles for School Choice” (with Marek Pycia)
[ WP ]
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION & EXCHANGE
- AXIOMATICS
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- ORGAN EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- PERSPECTIVES
“The Pennsylvania Adoption Exchange Improves Its Matching Process,” (with Vincent Slaugh, Mustafa Akan, Onur Kesten) INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, (March/April 2016) 46(2): 133-153
[ Journal | WP ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- FAMILY ECON.
- RECOMMENDER SYSTEMS
“Decomposing Random Mechanisms,” (with Marek Pycia) Journal of Mathematical Economics, (December 2015) 61: 21-33
[ Journal | WP ]
- RANDOM MECHANISMS
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- AXIOMATICS
- discrete convex analysis
“A Theory of School-Choice Lotteries,” (with Onur Kesten) Theoretical Economics, (May 2015) 10: 543-595
[ Open Access ] [ Slides ]
- PRIORITY-BASED ALLOCATION
- RANDOM MECHANISMS
- AXIOMATICS
- SCHOOL CHOICE
“Kidney Exchange and the Alliance for Paired Donation: Operations Research Changes the Way Kidneys are Transplanted,” (with Ross Anderson, Itai Ashlagi, David Gamarnik, Michael Rees, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez) INFORMS Journal on Applied Analytics, (Jan/Feb 2015) 45(1):24-42
[ Journal ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
“Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange,” (with Tayfun Sönmez) Journal of Economic Theory, (July 2014) 152: 105-129
[ Journal | WP ]
- Related: “Transplant Center Incentives in Kidney Exchange,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) unpublished mimeo, (March 2005)
[ PDF ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- gains on the extensive margin
“The `Boston’ School-Choice Mechanism: An Axiomatic Approach,” (with Fuhito Kojima) Economic Theory, (April 2014) 55(3): 515-544
[ Journal | WP ]
- PRIORITY-BASED ALLOCATION
- AXIOMATICS
- MATCHING MECHANISMS
- SCHOOL CHOICE
“Two Axiomatic Approaches to the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism,” (with Tadashi Hashimoto, Daisuke Hirata, Onur Kesten, Morimitsu Kurino) Theoretical Economics, (February 2014) 9: 253-277
[ Open Access ]
- Related: “On Characterizations of the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism Involving Incentive and Invariance Properties,” (with Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino) Mathematical Social Sciences, in honor of Herve Moulin, (November 2017) 90: 56-62 [ Journal ]
- Related: These papers are partially based on: “Fair and Efficient Assignment via The Probabilistic Serial Mechanism” (with Onur Kesten and Morimitsu Kurino) [ WP ]
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION
- AXIOMATICS
- RANDOM MECHANISMS
- fairness
“Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An Experimental Investigation,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Muriel Niederle) Games, Special Issue in Matching, (2013) 4(2): 243-282
[ Open Access ]
- MARKET FAILURE
- TWO-SIDED MATCHING
- LAB EXPERIMENTS
“House Allocation with Existing Tenants: A Characterization,” (with Tayfun Sönmez) Games and Economic Behavior, (July 2010) 69(2): 425-445
[ Journal | WP ]
[ First Draft (Feb. 2006) “Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan Donors: A Characterization”: WP ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE & ALLOCATION
- AXIOMATICS
- MECHANISM DESIGN
“Course Bidding at Business Schools,” (with Tayfun Sönmez) International Economic Review, (February 2010) 51 (1) 99–123
[ Journal | WP ] [ First Draft (2003): WP ]
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- unintended consequences
“Dynamic Kidney Exchange,” Review of Economic Studies, (January 2010) 77 (1): 372-414
[ ePrint | WP ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- DYNAMIC MATCHING
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- optimal policy design
“Ideology and Existence of 50%-Majority Equilibria in Multidimensional Spatial Voting Models,” (with Herve Cres) Journal of Theoretical Politics (2010) 22: 431-444
[ Journal | WP ]
- Related: “Toward a 50%-Majority Equilibrium When Voters are Symmetrically Distributed,” (with Herve Cres) Mathematical Social Sciences, in honor of Herve Moulin, (November 2017) 90: 145-149 [ Journal ]
- VOTING
- POLITICAL ECONOMY
- mean voter theorems
“A Non-simultaneous Extended Altruistic Donor Chain,” (with Michael Rees et al.) The New England Journal of Medicine, (March 2009) 360 (11): 1096-1101
[ ePrint ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
“Internet Auctions with Artificial Adaptive Agents: A Study on Market Design,” (with John Duffy) Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, (August 2008) 67 (2): 394-417
[ Journal | WP ]
- AUCTIONS
- AGENT-BASED COMP.
- unintended consequences
“Improving the Efficiency of Course Bidding at Business Schools: Field and Laboratory Studies,” (with Aradhna Krishna) Marketing Science, (March/April 2008) 27: 262-282
[ Journal & Online App. | WP ]
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION
- LAB & FIELD EXPERIMENTS
- unintended consequences
“Random Paths to Pairwise Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems: A Study on Market Equilibration,” (with Fuhito Kojima) International Journal of Game Theory, in Honor of David Gale‘s 85’th birthday, (March 2008) 36(3-4): 473-488
[ Journal | WP ]
- COALITION FORMATION
- TWO-SIDED MATCHING
- myopic deviations
“Unraveling Yields Inefficient Matching: Evidence from Post-Season College Football Bowls,” (with Guillaume Frechette and Alvin E. Roth) RAND Journal of Economics, (Winter 2007) 38(4): 967-982
[ Journal & Online App. | WP ]
- MARKET FAILURE
- MATCHING
- NATURAL EXPERIMENT
“Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences,” (with Tayfun Sönmez and Alvin E. Roth) American Economic Review, (June 2007) 97(3): 828-851
[ ePrint & Online App. & Simulation Files | WP ]
- National Science Foundation’s press release about Kidney Exchange
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- gains on the intensive margin
“Equilibrium Selection and the Role of Information in Repeated Matching Markets,” (with Ernan Haruvy) Economics Letters, (February 2007) 94: 284-289
[ Journal | PDF ]
- DYNAMIC MATCHING
- LAB EXPERIMENTS
- learning
“Utilizing List Exchange and Non-directed Donation through “Chain” Paired Kidney Donations,” (with Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, Francis L. Delmonico and Susan L. Saidman) American Journal of Transplantation, (November 2006) 6: 2694-2705
[ ePrint ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- gains on the extensive margin
“Games of Capacity Manipulation in Hospital-Intern Markets,” (with Hideo Konishi) Social Choice and Welfare, (August 2006) 27: 3-24
[ Journal | WP ]
- CENTRALIZED LABOR MARKETS
- MATCHING MECHANISMS
“Credible Group Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Problems,” (with Hideo Konishi) Journal of Economic Theory, (July 2006) 129: 57-80
[ Journal | WP ]
- COALITION FORMATION
- TWO-SIDED MATCHING
- farsighted deviations
“Asset Price Bubbles and Crashes with Near-Zero-Intelligence Traders,” (with John Duffy) Economic Theory, (April 2006) 27: 537-563
[ Journal | WP ]
- DOUBLE AUCTIONS
- MARKET FAILURE
- AGENT-BASED COMP.
“The Dynamics of Law Clerk Matching: An Experimental and Computational Investigation of Proposals for Reform of the Market,” (with Ernan Haruvy and Alvin E. Roth) Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, (March 2006) 30: 457-486
[ Journal & Experiment Instructions | WP ]
- LABOR MARKETS
- MARKET FAILURE
- LAB EXPERIMENTS
- AGENT-BASED COMP.
“Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation By Matching for Two and Three-Way Exchanges,” (with Susan L. Saidman, Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and Francis L. Delmonico) Transplantation, (2006) 81: 773–782
[ Journal ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- gains on the intensive margin
“Pairwise Kidney Exchange,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) Journal of Economic Theory, (December 2005) 125: 151-188
[ Journal | WP ] [ First draft (2004): NBER ]
- selected to the issue Articles celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Journal of Economic Theory edited by Karl Shell, Tilman Börgers, Alessandro Pavan (2020)
- MARKET DESIGN
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- AXIOMATICS
“House Allocation with Existing Tenants: An Equivalence,” (with Tayfun Sönmez) Games and Economic Behavior, (July 2005) 52: 153-185
[ Journal | WP ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE & ALLOCATION
- RANDOM MECHANISMS
- MECHANISM DESIGN
“On the Survival of Some Unstable Two-Sided Matching Mechanisms,” International Journal of Game Theory, (June 2005) 33: 239-254
[ Journal & Experiment Data & Online App. | WP ]
- MARKET FAILURE
- CENTRALIZED LABOR MARKETS
- LAB EXPERIMENTS
- AGENT-BASED COMP.
“Kidney Exchange,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) Quarterly Journal of Economics, (May 2004) 119: 457-488
[ ePrint ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
“Room Assignment-Rent Division: A Market Approach,” (with Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sönmez) Social Choice and Welfare, (June 2004) 22: 515-538
[ Journal | WP ]
- Related: “Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money” [ PDF ]
- FAIR DIVISION
- AUCTIONS
- envy-freeness
“On Determination of Optimal Reserve Prices in Auctions with Common Knowledge about the Ranking of Valuations,” (with Alexander Elbittar) In Murat R. Sertel and Semih Koray (Eds.): Advances in Economic Design, Springer, (2003) 79-94
[ PDF ]
- ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS
- reserve prices
- BOOK CHAPTER
“Backward Unraveling over Time: The Evolution of Strategic Behavior in the Entry-Level British Medical Labor Markets,” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, (June 2001) 25: 1039-1080
[ Journal | WP ]
- Best Graduate Student Paper Prize awarded by Society for Computational Economics (SCE) (1999).
- MARKET FAILURE
- CENTRALIZED LABOR MARKETS
- AGENT-BASED COMP.
Other Articles and Surveys
“Fair Access to Scarce Medical Capacity for Non-covid-19 Patients: A Role for Reserves.” (with Govind Persad, Parag A. Pathak, and Tayfun Sönmez) The British Medical Journal, (February 1, 2022) 376:o276.
[ Journal ]
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- EQUITY
- PERSPECTIVES
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- HEALTH
- MARKET DESIGN
- PERSPECTIVES
“Leverbytesprogram – framtid för Sverige?” (Liver Exchange – A future for Sweden?) (with Tommy Andersson and Tayfun Sönmez) Läkartidningen (The Journal of the Swedish Medical Association), 115, E9YL.
[ Journal ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- LIVER EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- PERSPECTIVES
“Market Design for Kidney Exchange,” (with Tayfun Sönmez). In Z. Neeman, A.E. Roth, N. Vulkan (Eds.): The Handbook of Market Design, Oxford University Press, (October 2013) 93-137.
[ PDF ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- BOOK CHAPTER
“New Sources in Living Kidney Donation,” (with Ruthanne Hanto, Alvin E. Roth, and Francis Delmonico). In D. B. McKay and S. M. Steinberg (Eds.): Kidney Transplantation: A Guide to the Care of Kidney Transplant Recipients, Springer (2010) 103-107.
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- BOOK CHAPTER
“Matching, Allocation, and Exchange of Discrete Resources,” (with Tayfun Sönmez). In J. Benhabib, A. Bisin, and M. Jackson (Eds.): Handbook of Social Economics, North-Holland, (2011) Vol. 1A: 781-852.
[ WP ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE & ALLOCATION
- BOOK CHAPTER
“Kidney Paired Donation with Compatible Pairs,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) American Journal of Transplantation, (2007) 7: 1.
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- REPLY
“A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings (renamed as AEA: Papers and Proceedings), (May 2005) 95(2): 376-380.
[ ePrint ] (Session refereed)
- MARKET DESIGN
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- KIDNEY EXCHANGE
- HEALTH
- IN PROCEEDINGS