
Working Papers
Older working papers are here
“Ordinal Simplicity and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design” (with Marek Pycia) Revision requested, International Economic Review
[ New Draft – Oct. 2023. WP ] [ Previous Draft – Nov. 2021: WP ] [ First Draft – Feb 2016: WP ]
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- SOCIAL WELFARE
- AXIOMATICS
- PRIVACY
“Market Design for Social Justice: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India” (with Tayfun Sönmez)
[ Nov. 2022: SSRN] [ Oct. 2022: arXiv]
- RESERVE SYSTEMS
- FAIRNESS
- CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
- AXIOMATICS
“Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application” (with Xiang Han, Onur Kesten)
[ Latest Draft : Oct 2022 SSRN ] [ Initial Draft: June 2021 WP ] [ Slides ] [ video present.: long | short ]
- Refereed proceeding publication of its extended abstract:
EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2021) 585-586.
[ Proceeding]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- HEALTH
- pricing rules
“Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care.” (with Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, and Vincent W. Slaugh)
[ March 2021: arXiv ]
- SEARCH & MATCHING
- FAMILY EC.
“Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools” (with Julien Combe, Umut Dur, Olivier Terciuex, Camille Terrier) Revision requested, American Economic Review
[ Feb. 2022: WP] [ Slides ] [ video present. ]
- CENTRALIZED LABOR MARKETS
- PROPERTY RIGHTS
- EQUITY
- MECHANISM DESIGN
- EDUCATION EC.
- EMPIRICS
Older Working Papers
“The Trade-off Between Vaccine Prioritization and Speed Depends on Mitigation Measures” (with Nikhil Agarwal, Andrew Komo, Chetan Patel, Parag A. Pathak)
[ Feb. 2021: medRxiv ]
- DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
- HEALTH
- SIR models
“Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design” (with Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
[ Latest Draft – Oct. 2020: PDF ] [ Older Draft – May 2020: WP | NBER ]
- Policy Impact
- Related: “White Paper: Expanding Access to Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma using Incentives” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
[ July 2020: PDF ]
- MARKET DESIGN
- DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
- HEALTH
- extensive margin
“Maintaining Diversity in Student Exchange,” (with Umut Dur and Onur Kesten)
[ April 2015: WP | PDF ] [ Slides ]
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION
- BALANCED EXCHANGE
- MECHANISM DESIGN
“Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money” final status: Revise&Resubmit at Social Choice and Welfare
[ March 2007: PDF ]
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION
- BALANCED EXCHANGE
- MECHANISM DESIGN
“Trading Cycles for School Choice” (with Marek Pycia) unpublished mimeo
[ July 2011: WP ]
- DISCRETE ALLOCATION
- MECHANISM DESIGN
“Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach” (with Murat Kurt, Mark S. Roberts, Andrew J. Schaefer) final status: Revise&Resubmit at Operations Research
[ Oct. 2011: PDF ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- STOCHASTIC GAMES
- HEALTH
“Transplant Center Incentives in Kidney Exchange,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) unpublished mimeo,
[ March 2005: PDF ]
- DISCRETE EXCHANGE
- INCENTIVES
- HEALTH