Working Papers


“Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools” (with Julien Combe, Umut Dur, Olivier Terciuex, Camille Terrier) Revision requested, American Economic Review
[ Feb. 2022: WP] [ Slides ] [ video present. ]

CENTRALIZED LABOR MARKETS
PROPERTY RIGHTS
EQUITY
MECHANISM DESIGN
EDUCATION EC.
EMPIRICS


“Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design” (with Marek Pycia) Revision requested, International Economic Review
[ Latest Draft – Nov. 2021: WP ] [ Older Draft “Arrovian Efficiency in Allocation of Discrete Resources” – Feb 2016: WP ]

MECHANISM DESIGN
SOCIAL WELFARE
AXIOMATICS
PRIVACY


“Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: A Theory of Multi-unit Exchange with Compatibility-based Preferences” (with Xiang Han, Onur Kesten)
[ June 2021: WP | SSRN] [ Slides ] [ video present.: long | short ]

  • Extended Abstract: EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2021) 585-586. [ Proceeding]

DISCRETE EXCHANGE
MECHANISM DESIGN
HEALTH
pricing rules


“Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators, and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Bumin Yenmez) Revision requested, Management Science
[ Latest Draft – Jan. 2021:arXiv ] [ video present.: short ]

  • Extended Abstract: EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2021) 785-786.[Proceeding]
  • Explanation of this paper’s policy impact and resources regarding software implementation resources we developed are available at www.covid19reservesystem.org.
  • Related: My policy simulation papers on vaccine allocation are here.
  • Initial Draft: “Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing”
    [ April 2020:WP | NBER ]


MARKET DESIGN
RESERVE SYSTEMS
EQUITY
HEALTH


“Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care.” (with Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, and Vincent W. Slaugh)
[ March 2021: arXiv ]

SEARCH & MATCHING
FAMILY EC.


“Neutral Allocation of Discrete Resources with Outside Options” (with Marek Pycia) Revision requested Review of Economic Design, special issue in honor of Semih Koray
[ Latest Draft – June 2022: PDF ]

DISCRETE ALLOCATION
AXIOMATICS
MECHANISM DESIGN


Older Working Papers


“The Trade-off Between Vaccine Prioritization and Speed Depends on Mitigation Measures” (with Nikhil Agarwal, Andrew Komo, Chetan Patel, Parag A. Pathak)
[ Feb. 2021: medRxiv ]

DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
HEALTH
SIR models


“Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design” (with Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
[ Latest Draft – Oct. 2020: PDF ] [ Older Draft – May 2020: WP | NBER ]

  • Policy Impact
  • Related: “White Paper: Expanding Access to Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma using Incentives” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
    [ July 2020: PDF ]

MARKET DESIGN
DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
HEALTH
extensive margin


“Maintaining Diversity in Student Exchange,” (with Umut Dur and Onur Kesten)
[ April 2015: WP | PDF ] [ Slides ]

DISCRETE ALLOCATION
BALANCED EXCHANGE
MECHANISM DESIGN


“Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money” final status: Revise&Resubmit at Social Choice and Welfare
[ March 2007: PDF ]

DISCRETE ALLOCATION
BALANCED EXCHANGE
MECHANISM DESIGN


“Trading Cycles for School Choice” (with Marek Pycia) unpublished mimeo
[ July 2011: WP ]

DISCRETE ALLOCATION
MECHANISM DESIGN


“Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach” (with Murat Kurt, Mark S. Roberts, Andrew J. Schaefer) final status: Revise&Resubmit at Operations Research
[ Oct. 2011: PDF ]

DISCRETE EXCHANGE
STOCHASTIC GAMES
HEALTH


“Transplant Center Incentives in Kidney Exchange,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) unpublished mimeo,
[ March 2005: PDF ]

DISCRETE EXCHANGE
INCENTIVES
HEALTH


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