“Ordinal Simplicity and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design” (with Marek Pycia) Revision requested, International Economic Review
[ New Draft – Oct. 2023. WP ] [ Previous Draft – Nov. 2021: WP ] [ First Draft – Feb 2016: WP ]

• MECHANISM DESIGN
• SOCIAL WELFARE
• AXIOMATICS
• PRIVACY

“Market Design for Social Justice: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India” (with Tayfun Sönmez)
[ Nov. 2022: SSRN] [ Oct. 2022: arXiv]

• RESERVE SYSTEMS
• FAIRNESS
• CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
• AXIOMATICS

“Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application” (with Xiang Han, Onur Kesten)
[ Latest Draft : Oct 2022 SSRN ] [ Initial Draft: June 2021 WP ] [ Slides ] [ video present.: long | short ]

• Refereed proceeding publication of its extended abstract:
  EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2021) 585-586.
  [ Proceeding]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• HEALTH
• pricing rules

“Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care.” (with Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, and Vincent W. Slaugh)
[ March 2021: arXiv ]

• SEARCH & MATCHING
• FAMILY EC.

“Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools” (with Julien Combe, Umut Dur, Olivier Terciuex, Camille Terrier) Revision requested, American Economic Review
[ Feb. 2022: WP] [ Slides ] [ video present. ]

• CENTRALIZED LABOR MARKETS
• PROPERTY RIGHTS
• EQUITY
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• EDUCATION EC.
• EMPIRICS

“The Trade-off Between Vaccine Prioritization and Speed Depends on Mitigation Measures” (with Nikhil Agarwal, Andrew Komo, Chetan Patel, Parag A. Pathak)
[ Feb. 2021: medRxiv ]

• DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
• HEALTH
• SIR models

“Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design” (with Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
[ Latest Draft – Oct. 2020: PDF ] [ Older Draft – May 2020: WP | NBER ]

• Policy Impact
• Related: “White Paper: Expanding Access to Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma using Incentives” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
  [ July 2020: PDF ]

• MARKET DESIGN
• DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
• HEALTH
• extensive margin

“Maintaining Diversity in Student Exchange,” (with Umut Dur and Onur Kesten)
[ April 2015: WP | PDF ] [ Slides ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• BALANCED EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money” final status: Revise&Resubmit at Social Choice and Welfare
[ March 2007: PDF ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• BALANCED EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Trading Cycles for School Choice” (with Marek Pycia) unpublished mimeo
[ July 2011: WP ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach” (with Murat Kurt, Mark S. Roberts, Andrew J. Schaefer) final status: Revise&Resubmit at Operations Research
[ Oct. 2011: PDF ]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• STOCHASTIC GAMES
• HEALTH

“Transplant Center Incentives in Kidney Exchange,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) unpublished mimeo,
[ March 2005: PDF ]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• INCENTIVES
• HEALTH