Working Papers


“Market Design for Social Justice: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India” (with Tayfun Sönmez)

RESERVE SYSTEMS
FAIRNESS
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
AXIOMATICS


“Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application” (with Xiang Han, Onur Kesten)

  • Extended Abstract: EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2021) 585-586.

DISCRETE EXCHANGE
MECHANISM DESIGN
HEALTH
pricing rules


“Search and Matching for Adoption from Foster Care.” (with Nils Olberg, Ludwig Dierks, Sven Seuken, and Vincent W. Slaugh) (Initial Draft March 2021)

SEARCH & MATCHING
FAMILY EC.


“Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools” (with Julien Combe, Umut Dur, Olivier Terciuex, Camille Terrier) Revision requested, American Economic Review

CENTRALIZED LABOR MARKETS
PROPERTY RIGHTS
EQUITY
MECHANISM DESIGN
EDUCATION EC.
EMPIRICS


“Arrovian Efficiency and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design” (with Marek Pycia) Revision requested, International Economic Review

MECHANISM DESIGN
SOCIAL WELFARE
AXIOMATICS
PRIVACY


“Fair Allocation of Vaccines, Ventilators, and Antiviral Treatments: Leaving No Ethical Value Behind in Health Care Rationing” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, M. Bumin Yenmez) Revision requested, Management Science

  • Extended Abstract: EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, (2021) 785-786.
  • Related: Explanation of this paper’s policy impact and resources regarding software implementation resources we developed are available at www.covid19reservesystem.org.
  • Related: My policy simulation papers on vaccine allocation are here.


MARKET DESIGN
RESERVE SYSTEMS
EQUITY
HEALTH


Older Working Papers


“The Trade-off Between Vaccine Prioritization and Speed Depends on Mitigation Measures” (with Nikhil Agarwal, Andrew Komo, Chetan Patel, Parag A. Pathak)

DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
HEALTH
SIR models


“Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design” (with Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)

  • Related: “White Paper: Expanding Access to Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma using Incentives” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)

MARKET DESIGN
DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
HEALTH
extensive margin


“Maintaining Diversity in Student Exchange” (with Umut Dur and Onur Kesten)

DISCRETE ALLOCATION
BALANCED EXCHANGE
MECHANISM DESIGN


“Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach” (with Murat Kurt, Mark S. Roberts, Andrew J. Schaefer) final status: Revision requested, Operations Research

DISCRETE EXCHANGE
STOCHASTIC GAMES
HEALTH


“Trading Cycles for School Choice” (with Marek Pycia) unpublished mimeo

DISCRETE ALLOCATION
MECHANISM DESIGN


“Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money” final status: Revision requested, Social Choice and Welfare

DISCRETE ALLOCATION
BALANCED EXCHANGE
MECHANISM DESIGN


“Transplant Center Incentives in Kidney Exchange,” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) unpublished mimeo

DISCRETE EXCHANGE
INCENTIVES
HEALTH


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