I am a Professor of Economics at Boston College and a microeconomic theorist with research interests in market design, mechanism design, and game theory, emphasizing the theory and practice of matching markets and allocation/exchange of discrete resources.

My recent research focuses on

  • Recent Survey Chapters on Matching Theory and Applications: [SÜ-2024] [SÜ-2024]
  • The theory, design, analysis, and implementation of the new organ and blood allocation and exchange mechanisms, such as kidney, liver, and dual-donor exchange clearinghouses and blood allocation with replacement donors:
    • Recent Market-Degin Impact: The first two 6-way, two-5-way, and four 4-way liver exchanges worldwide and a new exchange program. Recent Medical Market-Design Paper: [YSÜIASI-2024]
    • Recent Working Paper: [HKÜ-2022]
    • Recent Perspectives Paper: [SÜ-2023]
  • The theory of two-sided matching mechanisms with initial property rights and their applications to tuition exchange in college admissions, teacher (re)assignment, student exchange, and student-athlete transfer; and their implications on labor markets, education, etc.
  • The theory and applications of reserve systems:
    • Recent Market-Design Impact: The design and implementation of three allocation systems for scarce COVID-19 medicine and vaccine allocation reserve systems recommended by NASEM.
    • Recent Working Paper: [SÜ-2022]
  • Improving recommendation and matching systems used in adopting children, theory of search and matching.
  • Axiomatic theory and design of resource allocation or matching mechanisms.
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