I am a Professor of Economics at Boston College and a microeconomic theorist with research interests in market design, mechanism design, and game theory, emphasizing the theory and practice of matching markets and allocation/exchange of discrete resources.
My recent research focuses on
- The theory, design, analysis, and implementation of the new organ and blood allocation and exchange mechanisms, such as kidney, liver, and dual-donor exchange clearinghouses and blood allocation with replacement donors:
- Recent Impact: The first 4-way liver exchange and a new exchange program.
- The theory of two-sided matching mechanisms with initial property rights and their applications to tuition exchange in college admissions, teacher (re)assignment, student exchange, and student-athlete transfer; and their implications on labor markets, education, etc.
- The theory of reserve systems and applications to ethical allocation of scarce medical resources such as antivirals, ICU units, vaccines
- Recent Impact: The design of three allocation systems for scarce COVID-19 medicine.
- Improving recommendation and matching systems used in the adoption of children, theory of search and matching
- Axiomatic theory and design of resource allocation and matching mechanisms