I am a Professor of Economics at Boston College and a microeconomic theorist who has research interests in market design, mechanism design, and game theory with an emphasis on the theory and practice of matching markets and allocation/exchange of discrete resources.
My recent research focuses on
- The theory, design, analysis, and implementation of the new organ and blood allocation and exchange mechanisms, such as kidney, liver, and dual-donor exchange clearinghouses and blood allocation with replacement donors
- The theory of two-sided matching mechanisms with initial property rights and their applications to tuition exchange in college admissions, teacher (re)assignment, student exchange, and transfer of student-athletes; and their implications on labor markets, education, etc.
- The theory of reserve systems and applications to ethical allocation of scarce medical resources and affirmative action
- Improving recommendation and matching systems used in the adoption of children, theory of search and matching
- Axiomatic theory and design of resource allocation and matching mechanisms