I am a Professor of Economics at Boston College. My research interests are primarily in microeconomic theory on market design, matching markets, and the allocation/exchange of discrete resources. Through my research in market design, I also have an active interest in improving or designing real-world institutions. Some areas I have pioneered with my coauthors include the theory, design, and implementation of kidney-paired exchange systems, liver-paired exchange systems, reserve systems for scarce medical resource allocation, and recommendation systems for child adoption.

My research areas:

My working papers and publications are available here.
Also, an (imperfect) attempt at an area-based classification is made here.
Some of the topics that I have been interested in:

  • The design and implementation of the living-donor organ-paired exchanges, especially for liver and kidney, and blood allocation and exchange mechanisms.
  • Matching with (re)assignment and their applications to tuition exchange in college admissions, teacher (re)assignment, student exchange, and student-athlete transfer, and their implications on labor markets, education, etc.
  • The theory and real-life implementation of reserve systems, from the pandemic resource allocation to Indian affirmative action policies.
  • Theory and axiomatics of resource allocation and matching mechanisms in general.
  • Improving recommendation and matching systems used in adopting children and search and matching theory with an operations management focus.
  • Market failures and other consequences of centralized mechanisms or regulations in two-sided matching and labor markets.
  • Earlier in my career, I also worked on obtaining insights into market design using agent-based models from a complex systems perspective in economics, supplemented by human experiments.

Some background on my career:

Real-life impact of my research in market design:

(more details)

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