“Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools.” Revision requested at American Economic Review (with Julien Combe, Umut M. Dur, Olivier Tercieux, and Camille Terrier).
[ Feb ’22: WP ]

• DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
• REMATCHING
• MARKET DESIGN
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• EMPIRICS

“Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application.” (with Xiang Han, Onur Kesten) Revision requested at American Economic Review
[ Latest – May ’24: SSRN ] [ First – Jun ’21: WP ] [ Slides ] [ Video: long | short ]

• Refereed proceeding publication of its extended abstract:
  EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2021) 585-586.
  [ Proceeding]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• HEALTH
• pricing rules

“Ordinal Simplicity and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design.” (with Marek Pycia) Revision requested at International Economic Review.
[ Latest – Oct ’23: WP ] [ Older – Nov ’21: WP ] [ First – Feb ’16: WP ]

• MECHANISM DESIGN
• SOCIAL WELFARE
• AXIOMATICS
• PRIVACY

“Informed Neutrality in Minimalist Market Design: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India” (with Tayfun Sönmez)
[ Latest – Jun ’24: arXiv] [ Older – Nov. 2022: SSRN]

• RESERVE SYSTEMS
• FAIRNESS
• CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
• AXIOMATICS

“Rematching with Contracts under Labor Mobility Restrictions: Theory and Application.” (with Umut Dur and Robert G. Hammond)
[ Apr ’24: WP ]

• LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS
• MATCHING WITH CONTRACTS
• EMPIRICS

“Child Welfare Platform Design to Improve Outcomes for Children with Disabilities” (with Ludwig Dierks and Vincent W. Slaugh)
[ Latest – Mar ’24: WP ]

• CHILD WELFARE
• PLATFORM DESIGN

“The Trade-off Between Vaccine Prioritization and Speed Depends on Mitigation Measures.” (with Nikhil Agarwal, Andrew Komo, Chetan Patel, Parag A. Pathak) Mimeo.
[ Feb ’21: medRxiv | NBER ]

• DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
• HEALTH
• SIR models

“Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design.” (with Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez) Mimeo.
[ Latest – Oct ’20: PDF ] [ Older – May ’20: WP | NBER ]

• Policy Impact
• Related: “White Paper: Expanding Access to Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma using Incentives” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
  [ July 2020: PDF ]

• MARKET DESIGN
• DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
• HEALTH
• extensive margin

“Maintaining Diversity in Student Exchange.” (with Umut Dur and Onur Kesten) Mimeo.
[ Apr ’15: WP | PDF ] [ Slides ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• BALANCED EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money.” Mimeo, final status: Revise and resubmit at Social Choice and Welfare.
[ Mar ’07: PDF ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• BALANCED EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Trading Cycles for School Choice.” (with Marek Pycia) Mimeo.
[ Jul ’11: WP ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach.” (with Murat Kurt, Mark S. Roberts, Andrew J. Schaefer) Mimeo, final status: Revise and resubmit at Operations Research.
[ Oct ’11: PDF ]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• STOCHASTIC GAMES
• HEALTH

“Transplant Center Incentives in Kidney Exchange.” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) Mimeo.
[ Mar ’05: PDF ]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• INCENTIVES
• HEALTH