“Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Theory” (with Tayfun Sönmez) to appear as Chapter 1 of the Handbook of the Economics of Matching, Volume 1 (Elsevier) edited by Yeon-Koo Che, Pierre-Andre Chiaporri, and Bernard Salanie
[ April 2024: WP ]

• MATCHING
• MARKET DESIGN
• SURVEY CHAPTER

“Matching under Non-transferable Utility: Applications” (with Tayfun Sönmez) to appear as Chapter 3 of the Handbook of the Economics of Matching, Volume 1 (Elsevier) edited by Yeon-Koo Che, Pierre-Andre Chiaporri, and Bernard Salanie
[ March 2024: WP ]

• MATCHING
• MARKET DESIGN
• SURVEY CHAPTER

“Market Design for Distributional Objectives in (Re)assignment: An Application to Improve the Distribution of Teachers in Schools.” Revision requested at American Economic Review (with Julien Combe, Umut M. Dur, Olivier Tercieux, and Camille Terrier).
[ Feb. 2022: WP ]

• DISTRIBUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS
• REMATCHING
• MARKET DESIGN
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• EMPIRICS

“Blood Allocation with Replacement Donors: Theory and Application.” (with Xiang Han, Onur Kesten) Revision requested at American Economic Review
[ New Draft – May 2024 SSRN ] [ June 2021 WP ] [ Slides ] [ video present.: long | short ]

• Refereed proceeding publication of its extended abstract:
  EC ’21: Proceedings of the 22nd ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (2021) 585-586.
  [ Proceeding]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN
• HEALTH
• pricing rules

“Ordinal Simplicity and Auditability in Discrete Mechanism Design.” (with Marek Pycia) Revision requested at International Economic Review.
[ New Draft – Oct. 2023. WP ] [ Previous – Nov. 2021: WP ] [ First Draft – Feb. 2016: WP ]

• MECHANISM DESIGN
• SOCIAL WELFARE
• AXIOMATICS
• PRIVACY

“Informed Neutrality in Minimalist Market Design: A Case Study on a Constitutional Crisis in India” (with Tayfun Sönmez)
[ New Draft – June 2024: arXiv] [ Nov. 2022: SSRN]

• RESERVE SYSTEMS
• FAIRNESS
• CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
• AXIOMATICS

“Rematching with Contracts under Labor Mobility Restrictions: Theory and Application.” (with Umut Dur and Robert G. Hammond)
[ Apr. 2024: WP ]

• LABOR MARKET REGULATIONS
• MATCHING WITH CONTRACTS
• EMPIRICS

“Child Welfare Platform Design to Improve Outcomes for Children with Disabilities” (with Ludwig Dierks and Vincent W. Slaugh)
[ New Draft: March 2024: WP ]

• CHILD WELFARE
• PLATFORM DESIGN

“The Trade-off Between Vaccine Prioritization and Speed Depends on Mitigation Measures.” (with Nikhil Agarwal, Andrew Komo, Chetan Patel, Parag A. Pathak) Unpublished mimeo.
[ Feb. 2021: medRxiv | NBER ]

• DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
• HEALTH
• SIR models

“Paying It Backward and Forward: Expanding Access to Convalescent Plasma Therapy Through Market Design.” (with Scott Duke Kominers, Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez) Unpublished mimeo.
[ Latest Draft – Oct. 2020: PDF ] [ Older Draft – May 2020: WP | NBER ]

• Policy Impact
• Related: “White Paper: Expanding Access to Covid-19 Convalescent Plasma using Incentives” (with Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez)
  [ July 2020: PDF ]

• MARKET DESIGN
• DYNAMIC ALLOCATION
• HEALTH
• extensive margin

“Maintaining Diversity in Student Exchange.” (with Umut Dur and Onur Kesten) Unpublished mimeo.
[ April 2015: WP | PDF ] [ Slides ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• BALANCED EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Market Mechanisms for Fair Allocation of Indivisible Objects and Money.” Final status: Revise and resubmit at Social Choice and Welfare.
[ March 2007: PDF ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• BALANCED EXCHANGE
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Trading Cycles for School Choice.” (with Marek Pycia) Unpublished mimeo.
[ July 2011: WP ]

• DISCRETE ALLOCATION
• MECHANISM DESIGN

“Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game Approach.” (with Murat Kurt, Mark S. Roberts, Andrew J. Schaefer) Final status: Revise and resubmit at Operations Research.
[ Oct. 2011: PDF ]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• STOCHASTIC GAMES
• HEALTH

“Transplant Center Incentives in Kidney Exchange.” (with Alvin E. Roth and Tayfun Sönmez) Unpublished mimeo.
[ March 2005: PDF ]

• DISCRETE EXCHANGE
• INCENTIVES
• HEALTH