I am a Professor of Economics at Boston College. My research interests are primarily in microeconomic theory on market design, matching markets, and the allocation/exchange of discrete resources. Through my research in market design, I also have an active interest in improving or designing real-life institutions. Some areas I have pioneered with my coauthors are the design and real-life implementation of kidney-paired exchange systems, liver-paired exchange systems, reserve systems in scarce medical resource allocation, and recommendation systems in child adoption.

My research areas:

My list of publications is available chronologically here with area keywords, for all my working papers, see here with area keywords.
My CV includes my working papers and publications classified based on topics.
Some of the topics that I am recently interested in:

  • The design and implementation of the living-donor organ-paired exchanges, especially for liver and kidney, and blood allocation and exchange mechanisms
  • Matching with (re)assignment and their applications to tuition exchange in college admissions, teacher (re)assignment, student exchange, and student-athlete transfer, and their implications on labor markets, education, etc.
  • The theory and real-life implementation of reserve systems from the pandemic resource allocation to Indian affirmative action policies.
  • Theory and axiomatics of resource allocation and matching mechanisms in general.
  • Improving recommendation and matching systems used in adopting children and search and matching theory with an operations management focus.
  • Market failures and other consequences of centralized mechanisms or regulations in two-sided matching and labor markets.
  • Earlier in my career, I also worked on obtaining insights using agent-based models in market design through the perspective of complex systems in economics.

Some background on my career:

Real-life impact of my research in market design:

(more details)

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